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Volume 8 Autumn, 1958 Number 1
The Student Body: I958
The current student body of the Law School is made
up of residents of a great many states, and graduates
of an even larger number of universities and colleges.
The total enrollment of 352 includes students who
make their homes in the following states:
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Represented also are Hawaii, and Australia, Canada,
Egypt, England, Germany, Iraq, Israel, Scotland,
Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Counting the District of
Columbia, students of the School come from 38 states.
Exactly one-fourth are from the city of Chicago; one­
fifth are from the College of the University of Chicago.
The current entering class was selected from the larg­
est number of applications in the history of the School.
The one hundred eighty-nine colleges and univer­
sities represented in the student body are:
Aberdeen University
University of Alabama
Albion College
American University
Amherst College
Antioch College
Augustana College
Baghdad Law College (Iraq)
Balliol College, Oxford
University
Bard College
Barnard College
Beloit College
University of Beograd
(Yugoslavia)
University of Bern (Switzer-
land)
Birmingham Southern College
Boston University
Bowdoin College
Brandeis University
Brigham Young University
University of British Columbia
Brooklyn College
Brown University
Cairo University (Egypt)
University of California
Calvin College
Carleton College
University of Chicago
The Citadel
City College of San Francisco
Clark Junior College
Coe College
Colby College
Colgate University
University of Colorado
Columbia University
University of Connecticut
Cornell University
.
Dartmouth College
Davidson College
Denison University
DePaul University
DePauw University
University of Detroit
Drew University
Duke University
Earlham College
Elmhurst College
Emory University
Fisk University
University of Frankfurt
(Germany)
University of Freiburg
(Gennany)
Gateshead Talmudical College
University of Geneva Law
School (Switzerland)
George Washington University
Georgetown University
Gettysburg College
University of Graz (Austria)
Grinnell College
Johannes Gutenberg Univer-
sity (Germany)
Hamilton College
Hampton-Sydney College
Harvard University
Haverford College
University of Hawaii
Hertz Junior College
Hobart College
Hofstra College
College of the Holy Cross
Hope College
College of Idaho
University of Idaho
Illinois College
Illinois Institute of Technology
University of Illinois
Indiana University
Johns Hopkins University
University of Kansas
Kent State University
Kenyon College
Knox College
Lake Forest College
Lawrence College
University of Leiden (Nether-
lands)
London School of Economics
Louisville Municipal College
Loyola University (Chicago)
Macalester College
University of Maine
University of Marburg
(Germany)
Marquette University
Maryville College
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
University of Melbourne
( Australia)
� lercer University
University of Miami
Michigan State University
University of Michigan
Middlebury College
Miles College
Millikin University
University of Minnesota
University of Missouri
Montana State University
Morton Junior College
Mount Holyoke College
University of Munich
(Germany)
University of Munster
(Germany)
National University of Mexico
University of Nebraska
University of New Mexico
New York University
Niagara University
University of North Carolina
University of North Dakota
North Park Junior College
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University of North Stafford-
shire (England)
Northwestern University
University of Notre Dame
Oberlin College
Ohio State University
Ohio Wesleyan University
University of Omaha
University of Oregon
Our Lady of Providence Sem-
inary
Oviedo University
University of Paris
University of Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania State University
Pepperdine College
University of Pittsburgh
Pomona College
Portland State College
Princeton University
Providence College
Purdue University
Queens College of the City of
New York
Reed College
Ripon College
University of Rochester
Roosevelt University
Rutgers University
Saint John's Seminary
Saint Joseph's College
Saint Mary's College (Cali­
fornia)
Saint Mary's of the Lake Sem-
inary
Saint Olaf College
Shimer College
University of the South
South Dakota State College
Southern Illinois University
Southern Methodist University
Stanford University
University of Stockholm
Swarthmore College
Syracuse University
Talladega College
Temple University
University of Tennessee
University of Texas
Texas Western University
University of Toledo
University of Toronto
Trinity College, Cambridge
University
Trinity College (Connecticut)
University of Tubingen
(Germany)
Tufts College
University College of London
Valparaiso University
Vanderbilt University
University of Virginia
Wabash College
Washington State College
Washington University
(St. Louis)
University of Washington
Wesleyan University
Wes tern Reserve University
\Vheaton College
Whitman College
Williams College
Wilson Teachers College
University of Wisconsin
Wittenberg College
Woodrow Wilson City College
Woodstock College
College of Wooster
Wright Junior College
Xavier University (Ohio)
Yale University
Yeshiva University
'Vilbel' C. Katz, [ames Parker Hall Projessor of Laio.
The Philosophy of
l\;lidcentury Corporation Statutes
by WILBER C. KATZ
James Parker Hall Professor of Law, The University
of Chicago Law School.
Reprinted by permission from Law and Contemporary
Problems, published by the Duke University School of
Law, Durham" North Carolina. Copyright, 19.58,
hy Duke University.
I
In the "New Look" title for this symposium, the
Editor suggests a tempting figure of speech concerning
fashions in corporation laws. He invites contributors
to examine the models now on display and to describe
what it is that constitutes the "new look." It might
be entertaining to see how far one could spin out the
fashion-show analogy. (One uninhibited commentator
has, indeed, suggested that the contours of the
American Bar Association's Model Business Corpora­
tion Act make it a seductive invitation to irrespon­
sibility.") My pen, however, is too heavy for such
a task; and the Editor has used the term "philosophy"
in defining my subject. What is expected from me, I
take it, is a discussion of contemporary theories con­
cerning the purposes of corporation statutes and the
provisions appropriate for the accomplishment of those
purposes. In trying to meet this assignment, it seems
most promising to look not for theories embodied in
toto in particular statutes, but for theories reflected in
various statutes in different degrees and proportions.
The general purpose of incorporation statutes is to
provide a particular legal mode for the organization
of business enterprise. If we are to try to be "philo­
sophical," we must begin at the beginning; we must
begin with the concept of business enterprise and the
functicn of the law of business organization. For our
purposes, analysis of the concept of enterprise discloses
three elements: risk, control, and profit. Problems of
business organization are problems in the allocation
of these elements among the parties to the enterprise.
The law of business organization (agency, partner­
ships, corporations) is principally concerned with (1)
defining the area within which parties are free to allo­
cate risk, control, and profit as they wish, and (2)
prescribing the allocation of these elements in the
absence of express agreement.
I shall be interpreting the general problem of cor­
porate legislation as a problem in regulating the
allocation of these elements of enterprise so as to
promote responsibility 'of investment and manage­
ment. In the simplest type cf business unit, the un­
incorporated one-man enterprise, no such problem
arises. Risk, control, and profit are concentrated in the
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individual enterpriser. He operates under the general
rules of contracts, torts, and property-rules which are
backed up by remedial law, including the law against
transfers in fraud of creditors. These rules, in effect,
assign to the enterpriser (as profit or loss) the con­
sequences of his business decisions. Since he thus
takes the consequences, he has an incentive to act
responsibly-i.e., to act in the light of reasonable an­
ticipations. To the extent that he does so, his actions
are responsible in a broader sense also. Where enter­
prise is free and enterprisers act responsibly in their
own interests, they are led by market disciplines to
serve the social interest as well. For our purposes,
we need not spell out why this is so, since discussions
of the modern corporation invariably assume that in­
dividual enterprise has this desirable characteristic.
What such discussions question is the relevance of this
analysis to the large corporation, with its separation of
ownership from control.
It is not only the corporate form of organization,
however, which creates problems concerning separa­
tion of the elements of enterprise. Such problems arise
as soon as the enterprise makes use of employees.
Basic rules of agency law deal with these problems
and are best understood, it seems to me, as efforts to
prevent such separation of risk, control, and profit as
would jeopardize responsible m:magement. The rule
respondeat superior, always difficult to justify on or­
dinary tort principles, is understandable as an effort
to place the risks of the enterprise upon the enterprise,
to require the enterpriser to weigh such r-isks in mak­
ing his business calculations. Similarly, the liability
of the undisclosed principal, which is hard to explain
on contract principles, represents an effort to assure
responsibility in the decisions made by the owner of
Continued on page 13
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The Tax Avoidance Problem tn the
United States
by Walter J. Blum
Professor of Law
The University of Chicago Law School
The following paper was delivered at the Twelfth Tax
Conference of the Canadian Tax Foundation in Winni­
peg, Canada, in November, 1958. It is printed here
with the kind permission of the Foundation.
I have taken on the task of commenting briefly
upon the tax avoidance problem under the United
States income taxes.
Let me begin by defining the problem. I conceive
of it as centering on the question of what is to be
done about efforts of taxpayers to minimize their
taxes by arranging their affairs in more or less abnor­
mal or forced ways so as to comply literally with
statutory provisions that confer certain tax advan­
tages. Please note that I have narrowed the topic
somewhat. Excluded from it are attempts to stretch
or distort accounting judgments or classifications in
computing taxable income. Also left out are efforts
to defraud the government by willfully and knowingly
making out a false return, or by manufacturing untrue
evidentiary documents, or by doing the numerous
Professor Walter J. Blum.
things that are commonly regarded as tax crimes.
My subject concerns the gentle and sophisticated tax
dodger who hopes to succeed by taking advantage
of the law rather than by disobeying it. Fcrtunately,
I am not called upon to locate a precise line of de­
marcation between tax avoidance and tax fraud or
evasion.
Our campaign against the tax dodger has been
anchored mainly in the judiciary and legislature.
While the Treasury has attempted to combat avoid­
ance in the promulgation of regulations, this activity
has been of secondary importance, except where the
statute confers special power on the administrators in
avoidance situations. Some commentators have sug­
gested that the most logical way to deal with the
whole tax dodger problem would be to invest the
Treasury with broad substantive power to refine the
statutory rules in response to taxpayer ingenuity.
There is, however, virtually no support for undertak­
ing so far reaching a reform in our tax system. On
the contrary, the impartiality of the Treasury is still
widely questioned.
The courts generally have been in the forefront in
dealing with the avoidance problem. From the judi­
cial perspective, the central question can be restated
as this: Under what circumstances is formal compli­
ance with the explicit terms of the statute enough
to attain a tax advantage which it purports to confer?
Obviously this is basically a matter of statutory inter­
pretation. But it is one of peculiarly vital importance
for our tax structure. If the courts were to hold the
view that form always must prevail (unless the legis­
lature has specified otherwise), tax dodging would
be too easy, the public would soon become disturbed,
and the voluntary compliance foundation of our sys­
tem would be weakened. If the courts were to take
the extreme opposite view that form need never pre­
vail (unless explicitly provided by statute), tax law
would become too uncertain, and the resulting chaos
would materially impede business and financial opera­
tions. Our courts understandably have chosen a mid­
dle ground: form must sometimes prevail but not
always. And thus we face the basic judicial problem
of under what circumstances is it to prevail?
In reading the innumerable decisions in which this
question was at issue, one is not likely to find many
comfortable answers. In part the difficulty lies in the
rhetoric of saying that a taxpayer is free to arrange
his affairs so as to minimize taxes, and that a tax sav­
ings motive is immaterial in applying the statutory
rules (unless the statute states otherwise). This kind
of talk by courts solves nothing. The intent to mini­
mize taxes cannot control the question whether fcrm
should prevail because almost all rationally planned
business transactions do take taxes into account; and
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it should be equally plain that if such an intent were
not present, there would be no tax dodger problem.
Another part of the difficulty is that decisions often
seem to be by invective alone. It appears that the
taxpayer loses because something he has done is said
to be a "sham" or "artifice," or "device" or even worse.
Such a finding might be a sound basis for decision
where the taxpayer has represented that he has done
something - such as organized a corporation - when
in fact he has done nothing of the kind. In the cases
we are dealing with, however, the taxpayer in fact
has followed the form he has selected, even though
he chose it only because of tax considerations. To
call one of these transactions a sham is merely a way
of stating the conclusion that the form is not control­
ling, without telling us why adherence to form in the
particular case was not acceptable. It probably is
also a way of revealing the emotional reaction of the
court to the taxpayer's cunning.
A similar trouble is encountered in decisions which
go against the taxpayer on the precept that the tax
result is to be governed by what was actually done
rather than by some declared purpose, or that the
transaction under scrutiny is not in fact what it ap­
pears to be in form. These are both ways of stating
that in the particular case substance is to govern over
form, but in themselves they fail to teach us why
these cases differ from the many situations in which
form does control.
Equally unenlightening are most of the decisions
which rest merely on a purported discovery of a more
or less particularized legislative intention. Almost
always the actual controversy arises because the leg­
islature has not provided a sufficient guide on the
point and the court is called upon to repair the omis­
sion. Although judicial deference to legislative inten­
tion is statesmanlike, it need not obscure the fact that
Continued on page 28
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The High Court of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands
The author of this article, The Honorable Philip R.
Toomin, a member of the Law School Class of 1926,
engaged in the private practice of law in Chicago
prior to his appointment as Associate Justice of the
High Court of the Trust Territory. At the invitation
0t the Record, he has provided us with this descrip­
tion of the organization and work of his court.
Five thousand miles west of San Francisco sits an
unique court of the United States, carrying on its
daily business despite conditions of discomfort, hard­
�hip, and occasionally peril. Its territorial jurisdiction
l� probabl� the largest in the world, and its [urisdic­
tional subJect. matter practically unlimited. People
who come before it speak nine languages, none' ex­
cept their own being intelligible to any of them, and
none being intelligible to any member of the court.
No appeal lies from the final decisions of this tri­
bunal,
. �or is it bound to accord more than polite
recogmtIon to the decisions of the United States Su­
preme Court. Moreover, in order to become a work­
ing member of this court, it is necessary to pass the
United States drivers' road test, since the only method
of transportation on land is by truck or jeep. This
exposes the court to the charge that its opinions are
prepared by truck drivers. While this is in a sense
true, it is hoped they also reveal some influence of
the legal scholar.
Half of the year is spent by the two justices in cir­
cuit-hopping to the various judicial centers in an area
of some 3,000,000 square miles of water and 687 of
land. Travel is by plane, by freighter, launch, and
jeep; if necessary, it would be by outrigger canoe.
This court is known as the High Court of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. These islands are
those formerly mandated to Japan, in the Mariannas,
Marshalls, and Carolines groups, now under United
States Trusteeship. They fan out to the southwest and
southeast from Guam, which is the administrative
center of the administration, though not included in
the trusteeship. Included are famous battlegrounds
of. World War II such as Saipan, Peleliu, and Kwaja­
lein, and the scenes of atomic bomb testing at Eni­
wetok and Bikini.
One of the sources of irritation in the relations be­
tween the United States and Japan in the 1930's
:vas the persistence of the latter in fortifying these
Islands in violation of its mandate from the League
of Nations. It will be remembered that one of the
first acts o� Japan, after its declaration of war against
Germany m 1914, was the seizure of these islands.
Upon confirmation by the League of its control as
mandatory power in 1920, Japan undertook to incor­
porate the islands into its economic orbit. Its control
was complete and direct. Administrators from Japan
took over direction of political and economic affairs,
with comparatively few posts being allocated the
island populations. Production of crops was geared
to the needs of Japan's expanding economy, and colo­
nization went on at an accelerated pace, until finally
many of the principal islands counted more oriental
migrants than indigenous inhabitants.
After 1935, when Japan withdrew from the League
of Nations, its economic control over the islands was
broad.ened in keeping with the needs of its military
machine. Many of the fine harbors and their ap­
proaches were fortified, airstrips were installed, and
the principal islands dotted with military installations
and supply depots.
In 1944, the roll back of Japanese colonization and
development started with the United States invasion
of the Marshalls, and terminated with surrender of
the Palau group the following year. As each island
group surrendered, its administration passed to the
Department of the Navy.
Initially the only administration the Navy was au­
thorized to establish was strictly military, in accord­
ance with the international law of belligerent OCCll­
pation. The legal system applied was that of the
military government, with law and order enforceable
by the military forces, and only such civil rights rec­
ognized as accorded with the needs and views of the
military authorities.
After creation of the United Nations, however, the
situation changed, with the acceptance by the United
Continued on page 42
The Planning Committee of the Eleventh Annual Federal Tax
Conference sponsored by the Law School, with fJ number of
the Conference speakers. A detailed report of the Conference
will be found in this issue of the Record.
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The Eleventh Annual
Federal Tax Conference
In the last week in October, the Law School, for the
eleventh successive year, sponsored its annual Con­
ference on Federal Taxation. The Conference, which
was held in the auditorium of the Prudential building,
is intended to present an analysis of principal current
issues in federal taxation, by authorities in the field.
It is a three day long affair, which this year attracted
about four hundred fifty lawyers, tax accountants,
corporate executives who work with tax problems, and
representatives of the Internal Revenue Service. The
Planning Committee which arranged the Conference
consisted of: John Potts Barnes, MacLeish, Spray,
Price and Underwood; Walter J. Blum, Professor of
Law, The University of Chicago Law School; Charles
\V. Davis, Hopkins, Sutter, Owen, Mulroy and Wentz;
Frederick O. Dicus, Chapman and Cutler; William
M. Emery, Chairman, McDermott, Will and Emery;
William N. Haddad, Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd;
James D. Head, Winston, Strawn, Smith and Patterson;
Paul F. Johnson, Ernst and Ernst; Robert R. Jorgensen,
Sears, Roebuck and Company; William A. McSwain,
Eckhart, Klein, McSwain and Campbell; James M.
Ratcliffe, Assistant Dean, The University of Chicago
Law School; Frederick R. Shearer, Mayer, Friedlich,
Spiess, Tierney, Brown and Platt; Michael J. Sporrer,
Arthur Andersen and Company.
The program of the Conference was as follows:
ADDRESS OF WELCOME
Donald L. Cartland, Comptroller, The University of
Chicago
THE ACTIVITIES AND INTERESTS OF THE
CHIEF COUNSEL
Arch Cantrall, Chief Counsel, U. S. Internal Revenue
Service; Washington
FRINGE BENEFIT PROGRAMS
Matthew F. Blake, of Hurdman and Cranstoun; New
York
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN VALUING
INVENTORIES
Everett C. Johnson, Arthur Andersen and Company
TRUSTS AND THE GRANTOR
James P. Johnson, of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd
TAX CAUTIONS IN ESTATE PLANNING
Anderson Owen, of Hopkins, Sutter, Owen, Mulroy
and Wentz
PANEL DISCUSSION OF TWO PREVIOUS TOPICS:
Frederick O. Dicus, of Chapman and Cutler
James P. Johnson, of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd
Anderson Owen, of Hopkins, Sutter, Owen, Mulroy
and Wentz
James C. Daubenspeck, of Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson,
Chaffetz and Masters
Roland K. Smith, of Isham, Lincoln & Beale
REDEMPTION PROBLEMS - THE HOLSEY AND
ZIPP CASES
Robert F. Graham, of Gardner, Carton, Douglas,
Roemer and Chilgren
CORPORATE ACCUMULATION OF EARNINGS
David Altman, of the Illinois Bar
PANEL DISCUSSION OF TWO PREVIOUS TOPICS:
Charles W. Davis, of Hopkins, Sutter, Owen, Mulroy
and Wentz
Robert F. Graham, of Gardner, Carton, Douglas,
Roemer and Chilgren
David Altman, of the Illinois Bar
Frank H. Uriell, of Pope and Ballard
William M. Emery, of McDermott, Will and Emery
CORPORATE SEPARATIONS
Seymour S. Mintz, of Hogan and Hartson; Washington
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS PERTAINING TO
COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
Irving 1. Axelrad, of Mitchell, Silberberg and Knupp;
Los Angeles
PANEL DISCUSSION OF ABOVE TOPICS:
James D. Head, of Winston, Strawn, Smith and
Patterson
Seymour S. Mintz, of Hogan and Hartson
Irving 1. Axelrad, of Mitchell, Silberberg and Knupp
Walter J. Rockler, of Lederer, Livingston, Kahn and
Adsit
Frederick R. Shearer, of Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess,
Tierney, Brown and Platt
SUBCHAPTER S-CORPORATIONS
Max E. Meyer, of Lord, Bissell and Brook
LITIGATION POLICY OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL'S
OFFICE IN CIVIL TAX CASES
Paul E. Treusch, U. S. Internal Revenue Service;
Washington
PRIORITY OF FEDERAL TAX LIENS
Herman T. Reiling, U. S. Internal Revenue Service;
Washington
PANEL DISCUSSION OF SECOND TOPIC:
John Potts Barnes, of MacLeish, Spray, Price and
Underwood
Paul E. Treusch, U. S. Internal Revenue Service
Herman T. Reiling, U. S. Internal Revenue Service
Ralph F. Huck, of Chapman and Cutler
Daniel S. Wentworth, Jr., of Chicago Title and Trust
Company
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ROUND TABLE
A discussion of procedures and programs of the In­
ternal Revenue Service in dealing with the admin­
istration of federal taxation.
Walter .T. Blum, Chairman, Professor of Law, The
University of Chicago Law School
Charles W. Davis, of Hopkins, Sutter, Owen, Mulroy
and Wentz
William N. Haddad, of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd
David F. Long, Regional Counsel, U. S. Internal Rev­
enue Service
Wallace T. Morris, Assistant Regional Commissioner,
U. S. Internal Revenue Service
Andrew J. O'Donnell, Jr., Assistant Regional Commis­
sioner, U. S. Internal Revenue Service
H. Lloyd Brownlow, Executive Assistant to Assistant
Regional Commissioner, U. S. Internal Revenue
Service
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The Students and Mr. Jenner
Early in each academic year, the Law School spon­
sors a public lecture, usually on some topic connected
with the practice of law or the legal profession, and
intended primarily for students who have just begun
their work at the School. The lecture is preceded by a
dinner for the entering students.
This autumn, the speaker was Albert E. Jenner, Jr.,
of the Chicago firm of Thompson, Raymond, Mayer,
Jenner and Bloomstein. Mr. Jenner has served as Pres­
ident of the Illinois State Bar Association, and is cur­
rently President of both the American Judicature
Society and the American College of Trial Lawyers.
His topic was "The People's Privileged Few." The
text of Mr. Jenner's lecture will appear in the Winter
Quarter, 1959, issue of the Law School Record.
Prior to the lecture, the Faculty and entering stu­
dents were joined at dinner by the members of the
Visiting Committee of the Law School, and members
of the Board of the Law School Alumni Association.
In addition to informal photographs of the evening's
events which may be found on this, and contiguous
pages, several pictures of members of the Visiting
Committee and of the Alumni Board may be found
elsewhere in this issue of the Record.
Before the dinner for entering students, Laird Bell, JD'07,
LLD'53 (han.), member of the Visiting Committee and former
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the University, chats
with Han. Walter L. Pope, JD'12, Judge of the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit; San Francisco, and Justice
Walter Schaefer, JD'28, of the Illinois Supreme Court.
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Esq., of the Visiting Committee, speak­
ing in Breasted Hall.
At the reception preceding the lecture by Mr. Jenner, left
to right, Kenneth Montgomery, of the Visiting Committee,
Glen A. Lloyd, JD'23, Chairman of the Board of Trustees
of the University and former president of the Law Alumni
Association, John Leary, Associate Director of the American
Bar Foundation, Han. Willis W. Ritter, JD'24, Chief Judge
of the U. S. District Court, Salt Lake City, and George Ran­
ney, lr., Trustee of the University and member of the Visiting
Committee.
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The dinner for entering students, which opened the Autumn Quarter.
Justice Charles H. Davis, JD'31, of the Illinois Supreme Court,
with William C. Burns, JD'31 , Vice President of the Alumni
Association, and Stuart B. Bradley, JD'30, of the Alumni Board.
Albert E. Jenner, [r., center, who addressed the entering stu­
dents, talking with Ben Heineman, left, of the Visiting Com­
mittee, and Charles A. Bane, '37, right, member of the Alumni
Board and Lecturer in Law.
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Among the Members of the Visiting Committee of
the University of Chicago Law School
Upper right:
Left to right, standing, Thomas R. Mulroy, JD'28, Ben W. Heineman, George E. Hale, JSD'40; seated, Kenneth E. Montgomery,
Thomas Sunderland, Hon. Samuel B. Epstein, JD'15.
Lower right:
Left to right, standing, George Ranney, [r., Frank]. Madden, JD'22, Paul H. Moore, JD'23; seated, Herbert C. DeYoung, JD'28,
Hon. Walter V. Schaefer, JD'28, Erwin Roemer.
Below:
Left to right, standing, Laurence A. Carton, JD'47, Owen Fairweather, JD'38; seated, Harry N. Wyatt, JD'21 , Hon. Hugo M.
Friend, JD'08, Tappan Gregory.
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A New Publication
In October, the Law School published the first issue
of a new annual, The Journal of Law and Economics.
The Journal will be devoted to matters of interest to
both lawyers and economists. It is edited by Aaron
Director, Professor of Economics in the Law School.
The first issue contained the following articles:
British Monopoly Policy 1944-56
by John Jewkes
Price Discrimination in Medicine
by Reuben A. Kessel
The Economies of Scale
by George J. Stigler
The United States Taxation of Foreign Income
by Stanley S. Surrey
Managing the Public Debt
by Herbert Stein
Competition and Democracy
by Gary S. Becker
Economics and the Conservation Question
by Scott Gordon
Government and Agriculture: Is Agriculture a Spe-
cial Case?
by D. Gale Johnson
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.)
Case
by John S. McGee
City Planning: An Analysis of the Content of the
Master Plan
by Allison Dunham
Professor Aaron Director.
InMemoriam
We note with regret the death of four eminent alumni.
Alison Reppy, JD'22, entered private practice in St.
Louis, following his graduation, with the firm of
Buder and Buder. He later taught, primarily in the
fields of Constitutional Law and Common Law Plead­
ing, at the University of Oklahoma, Rutgers, and New
York University. For twenty-two years he edited the
New York University Law Quarterly; he founded and
edited the Air Law Review. From 1950 until his death
he was Dean of the New York Law School.
Albert Stump, JD'17, of Indianapolis, was Demo­
cratic nominee for Senator from Indiana in 1926 and
1928. A partner in the firm of Stump and Emswiller,
Mr. Stump was considered an authority on medical
malpractice law. For more than thirty years, he lec­
tured on this subject at the Medical School of Indiana
University.
Robert Redfield, Jr., JD'21, was Robert Maynard
Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor of Anthro­
pology at the University of Chicago. One of the most
distinguished anthropologists in the history of the
discipline, Mr. Redfield spent the major portion of
his professional career at the University. Among his
many accomplishments should be listed his service as
the dean of the Division of the Social Sciences at the
University, in which capacity he succeeded in carry­
ing through a sweeping reorganization to create the
functioning entity active today. At a memorial service
for Mr. Redfield, former Chancellor Hutchins quoted
these words of Mr. Redfield's: "The end of man's ex­
istence is not cooperation. It is not even safety. It is
to live up to the fullest possibilities of humanity. And
man is human only as he knows the good and shares
that knowledge with those to whom he is, in humanity,
bound . . . the movement of man cannot be stayed.
We go forward, even toward uncertainty and doubt
. . . it is enough if we can find the effort a significant
joy.
Edgar N. Durfee, JD'08, spent his entire professional
career in the teaching of law and in legal research.
Following his graduation he was for a brief period
a member of the faculty of the University of Idaho.
In 1911 he joined the faculty of the University of
Michigan, where he remained until his retirement. He
taught and wrote widely in a variety of fields, in­
cluding legal history, remedies, and debtor-creditor
relations. He was the author of well-known casebooks
on Equity and on Security.
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The Delegation Grows
We can make no attempt at this time to list com­
pletely the alumni who were elected to high govern­
mental positions in November. We congratulate them
all and hope to bring news of them as we continue
to survey our alumni. As representative of all who
were elected we might mention Governor A. A. Ribi­
coff, LLB'33, of Connecticut; Senator Roman L.
Hruska, '32, of Nebraska; Attorney-General-elect Stan­
ley Mosk, '35, of California, and Congressman-elect
William S. Boylston, JD'50, of Florida.
Katz-Continued from page 3
a business, to make it impossible for the owner to hide
behind an irresponsible agent. This explanation ap­
plies also to the common-law liability of secret
partners. Furthermore, the rules establishing agents'
fiduciary duties and disabilities represent attempts to
promote responsible action by agents in the interest of
their principals. Again, the rule that agency powers
are ordinarily revocable, even when stated to be ir­
revocable, represents another striking effort to check
the irresponsible action which might result from ir­
revocable separation of risk and control. This inter­
pretation explains also the exception to this rule in the
case of powers coupled with an interest or powers
given as security. The exception permits one who
thus participates in the risks of the enterprise to be
given irrevocably a share in its control.
These rules reflect concern lest responsible manage­
ment be jeopardized by arrangements separating risk,
control, and profit. They leave great freedom, how­
ever, for the allocation of these elements. For ex­
ample, one who lends money or sells goods to a part­
nership may agree to look solely to partnership assets,
thus assuming a share of the enterprise risk. A lender
may agree to take a share of the profits in lieu of
interest, or an employee may do so in lieu of fixed
salary. They thus become participants in both the
profits and the risks of the enterprise, but without shar­
ing the liability of partners. The variety of these
voluntary arrangements for sharing risk, control, and
profit is enormous. As already indicated, a primary
function of the law of business organization is the set­
ting of limits to the possible variations. When the
corporate form of organization is made available by
statute, the principal legislative question is whether
there are special threats to irresponsibility inherent in
the corporate form which require special restraints on
the freedom to allocate risk, control, and profit.
"Philosophies" of corporate statutes reflect divergent
answers to this question. Some of these theories will
first be stated briefly; 'in the next part, representative
statutory provisions will be examined to ascertain the
relative influence of the various theories; and then we
should be in a position to consider whether there is a
dominant philosophy of the "new look."
1. The first contemporary theory which I shall con­
sider is the theory that a corporation statute should be
merely an "enabling act." Under this theory, the
privilege of incorporation with "limited liability"
should be made freely available, and promoters should
have freedom in defining the scope of the enterprise
and in allocating risk, control, and profit through the
corporation's security structure. This theory prescribes
also that relatively unhampered procedures should
be available to meet changing conditions by effecting
changes in corporate purposes and security structures.
No special conditions on the use of the corporate
form are deemed necessary. This theory implies that
decisions for commitment of funds are the individual
responsibility of the investor or lender, protected,
however, by the law of deceit. Adherence to the
agreed allocation of risks is deemed adequately as­
Slued by the rules of contracts and fraudulent convey­
ances; management loyalty is adequately promoted by
the rules concerning fiduciary duties and disabilities.
This theory reflects also a skepticism as to the
effectiveness of protective devices suggested by alter­
native theories. It is feared also that incomplete
legislative protections may result in relaxation of in­
dividual efforts at self-protection, efforts which are
deemed indispensable if investment decisions are to
be responsibly made.
Advocates of the "enabling act" theory reject the
notion that a ccrporation statute should deal with the
problem of possible monopoly. This theory, therefore,
c3.11s for no limitations of size, duration, purposes, or
general powers."
The "enabling act" theory does not mean that an
adequate corporation statute can be simple and brief.
To serve effectively as an enabling act, it must make
its grants of power and its authorized procedures suf­
ficiently detailed to minimize doubts, including doubts
which might arise from previous statutes and their
judicial interpretation.
2. The second theory, like the first, is grounded on
the premise that the social interest is best served
through responsible individual decisions in the further­
ance of individual interests. The second, however,
reflects a belief that for corporate organization, the
basic common-law doctrines of contracts, torts, and
agency are inadequate to assure responsible individual
decision, that these doctrines should be elaborated and
supplemented at various points to make it less likely
that agreements as to division of risk, control, and
profit may be inadvisedly made or ineffectually im­
plemented.
For example, to provide a setting for responsible in-
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dividual decision, a corporation statute may include
detailed provisions as to the relative rights of creditors
and shareholders, and of holders of different classes
of shares-provisions which leave the parties free to
determine these rights, but which formalize the way
in which the determination must be made and which
provide rules applicable in the absence of contrary
determination by the parties. A statute drawn on
this theory might spell out the application of the law
of deceit in the corporation setting. It might go
further and relieve lenders and investors of the burden
of asking the appropriate' questions, creating affirm­
ative duties of disclosure in order to make it more
probable that decisions as to commitment of funds,
exercise of voting rights, etc. will be responsibly made.
Such a statute might also codify other general rules
in their particular application to corporate organiza­
tion, such as the rules prescribing fiduciary standards
of loyalty and prohibiting transfers in fraud of credi-
tors. In such codification, the rules might be strength­
ened to block evasion opportunities peculiar to the
corporate situation. In short, the second theory still
looks to individual decisions made with responsibility,
but it advocates the creation of a statutory setting
fostering such responsibilty.
3. The third theory prescribes a more drastic
remedy, lest risks be. inadvertently assumed and
powers inadvisedly exercised. It prescribes restrictions
on the freedom of the parties to allocate risk, control,
and profit by contract. It conceives the task of the
legislature as including that of identifying particular
types of allocation which are deemed to jeopardize
responsible investment and management. For example,
the statutes might outlaw nonvoting stock, prescribe a
specified margin of safety for creditors, or require
more than a simple majority vote for various corporate
readjustments.
A point should be added which is applicable to both
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the second and third theories. Their purpose in at­
tempting to check irresponsible enterprise may be not
only to protect the investors and creditors directly in­
volved, but also to reduce the likelihood of financial
catastrophes which might destroy the climate of rea­
sonable confidence which business enterprise requires."
But whichever may be the dominant motive, the
statutes are designed to promote responsible decisions
in the interests of investors and creditors. Since the
third theory attempts to do this by limiting the area of
permissible arrangements, it may fairly be called a
"paternal responsibility" theory.
4. The fourth theory is a theory of "social respon­
sibility." Its adherents disparage the foregoing theories
as all but irrelevant to the large corporation with its
wide dispersion of ownership among inactive stock­
holders. It is asserted that management neither can
nor should be made wholly responsible to stockholders.
Absentee owners who have abdicated control have
no ethical basis for a claim that the enterprise be con­
ducted to maximize their return. Furthermore, in many
industries, so large a fraction of the business is said to
be concentrated in a few large corporations that con­
sumers are inadequately protected by market com­
petition. Similarly, where a single plant employs
a large fraction of the labor force of the locality, it is
argued t hat alternate employment opportunities
furnish inadequate protection against management
decisions to reduce operations or to relocate. It is
urged that corporate managers should be under no
obligation to maximize profit, but should have a wider
responsibility; that they should exercise corporate
powers in the interest not only of shareholders, but
also of employees, customers, and the "general public."
While this theory has been much discussed by phi­
losophers of corporation law, it has almost no reflec­
tion in the actual statutes. The one exception is the
wide adoption of provisions authorizing corporate
gifts to charity. Professor Berle considers the chari­
table-gift statutes as showing the direction of a "20th
Century Capitalist Revolution."4 We shall consider
other statutory changes which a "social responsibility"
theory might support after we have reviewed the way
in which midcentury statutes deal with a represen­
tative group of problems and after we have attempted
to measure the influence of the first three theories.
II
1. Creditors' margin of safety
Nineteenth-century corporation statutes embodied
in various ways the concept of a capital fund, or
margin of safety, for creditors as a substitute for the
personal liability of shareholders. The amount of the
margin was the par value of the shares issued. The
margin requirement was implemented, in varying
Later in the day, Sir Leslie met informally with students for
tea in the Lounge of the Law Dormitory.
degrees of effectiveness, by provisic ns making sub­
scribers liable for the full amount of the p�u value and
protecting this "capital" against impairment throug�
dividends or purchase of outstanding shares. Some of
the statutes prescribed a maximum ratio of debt to
stock investment, but these provisions were gr::tdually
eliminated and the amount of the creditr rs' margin left
to the will of the incorporators- except for a purely
nominal flat minimum. American statutes were, thus,
similar to the British Companies Act which W. S.
Gilbert lampooned in Utopia, Ltd. According to
Gilbert, the statute required of incorporators nothing
more than "a public declaration to what extent they
mean to pay their debts."
The American statutes often left serious gaps in the
implementation of the margin-of-safety concept. There
were sometimes no teeth in the requirement that the
capital be paid in, and provisions as to maintenance of
capital were commonly incomplete. Of more impor­
tance, there were often provisions authorizing reduc­
tion of capital without any restriction for protection of
existing creditors such as the British requirement of
court approval. Authorization of no-par value shares
introduced further complexities and doubts. While
most of the statutes probably left some place for "stock­
watering" liability on no-par value shares, it was
doubtful whether the shareholders were required to
underwrite the valuation of the entire consideration for
their shares or only the portion labeled "stated capital,"
excluding any amount allocated to "paid-in surplus."
This became an important question as to par value
shares also with the advent of the current practice of
issuing shares with an arbitrarily low par value and a
large paid-in surplus.
Following the Model Act as revised in 1955,:; several
recent statutes have cleared up the confusion as to
paid-in surplus. This has been accomplished by re-
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quiring that the consideration for shares, whether par
or no-par value, shall be fixed in dollars and by im­
posing shareholders' liability in terms not of par or
stated value, but of the full consideration fixed for the
shares (subject to good faith valuation of property
transferred in payment). The same statutes, however,
often leave creditors without protection against
distributions in "partial liquidation," even to the extent
of the stated capital." The extension or clarification of
stock-watering liability in these statutes cannot, there­
fore, be interpreted as an implementation of the
margin-of-safety notion, but merely as an effort to
check the obtaining of credit through an intentionally
misleading balance sheet.
As already suggested, twentieth-century statutes
have often permitted formal reduction of capital with­
out protection of existing creditors. Several recent
statutes, following the Model Act, have abolished
even the necessity of formal reduction and have
authorized dividends out of stated capital in partial
liquidation if the articles so provide or if shareholder
vote is secured." The limit to such distribution is
reached only at the point of insolvency, which is usual­
ly defined in recent statutes as an inability to pay
debts as they mature in the usual course of business.
Some of the recent statutes, however, retain and
revitalize the margin-of-safety concept. Thus, neither
Texas nor North Carolina authorizes distributions
directly "out of" stated capital, and both put restraints
upon distribution of surplus created by reduction of
stated capital. Texas dramatically departs from the
Model Act by providing that distributions of reduction
surplus shall make directors liable to creditors existing
at the time of the reduction in the event of later in­
solvency." North Carolina requires that any distribu­
tion of capital surplus (including reduction surplus)
must leave assets at least twice the amount of the
debts." Both of these statutes appear designed to block
distributions which would subject creditors to risks
which they might not reasonably anticipate. The Texas
provision establishes a limit to creditors' risks in terms
of stated capital, but the stated capital may be fixed at
an arbitrary minimum. The North Carolina provision
cannot be reduced to nominal effect, since it covers
not only stated capital, but also capital surplus; the
margin originally fixed may be reduced, however, so
long as there remains a margin of 100 per cent over
debts. None of the statutes contains any substantial
requirement of original junior investment.
In this field, therefore, none of the statutes reflects
the "paternal responsibility" theory, as do the Public
Utility Holding Company Act and chapter ten of the
Bankruptcy Act, with their control of debt-equity
ratios.'? What the recent statutes do, in varying de­
grees, is to protect a margin once established or pur-
ported to have been established. They thus illustrate
my second theory, clarifying the original agreement
or representation as to risk and providing relief by
adapting general principles of contracts or deceit. But
since most of the statutes take few steps in this direc­
tion, they illustrate basically the first or "enabling act"
theory, leaving it to creditors to make their own
bargains for the limitation of their risk. As a re­
sult, elaborate covenants restricting dividends and
other distributions and share purchases are now com­
mon features not only of bond and debenture inden­
tures, but also of other types of agreements for exten­
sion of credit.
2. Promotion and security flotation
Apart from statute, courts have imposed upon ccr­
porate promoters duties beyond those established by
the common law of deceit. Promotors have been held
to be fiduciaries subject to an affirmative duty of dis­
closure, for breach of which the corporation may, in
certain situations, recover. Btit'it has been open to the
promoter to aVOId this result by having all the shares
issued initially to himself, with sales to the public
made by him rather than by the corporation. In this
situation, the promoter is free from common-law
liability, unless his conduct amounted to deceit. It is
usually not difficult to arrange the promotion trans­
actions in the form which thus minimizes risk of
liability.
The recent North Carolina statute is unique in clos­
ing this loophole. It includes within its definition of
"watered shares" (which are made subject to cancel­
lation or assessment) all shares issued to promoters
for overvalued property which unfairly dilute the
holdings cf other shareholders to whom adequate
disclosure has not been made.P Thus, in North
Carolina, corporation lawyers can no longer defeat
the requirement of disclosure by mere technical ar­
rangement of promotion transactions.
Draftsmen of other ccrporation statutes have ig­
nored this problem, perhaps because the separate
securities acts or "blue sky" laws provide statutory
remedies for purchasers of stock. While these statutes
are beyond the scope of this symposium, one point may
be noted as to how they illustrate the general theories
considered in this paper. This is the familiar contrast
between the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and the
typical state securities law. The federal act, like the
North Carolina promoters' profit provision, is a disclo­
sure act; it thus illustrates my second theory, supple­
menting and reinforcing the law of deceit in order to
promote responsible investment. The state securities
acts, on the other hand, usually vest in their admin­
istrators discretionary power to halt the sale of securi­
ties which are deemed to be "inequitable" or which
would "tend to work a fraud." For example, under
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these statutes, maximum selling commissions are often
established and particular types of financing arrange­
ments are forbidden. Such provisions illustrate, or
course, my third, or "paternal responsibility," theory.
Even the SEC, furthermore, exercises influence on the
terms of security flotations not only through its dis­
closure requirements, but also by conditioning the
exercise of its discretionary power to accelerate
registration upon compliance with certain approved
standards.P
3. Fiduciary duties and their enforcement
Application to corporate officers and directors of
the agency standards of fiduciary loyalty has generally
been accomplished without the aid of statute. Legisla­
tion in this field, however, has been on the increase.
A few of the statutory provisions have tightened
fiduciary standards. Several recent statutes have flatly
forbidden all loans to officers and directors. A few
have facilitated derivative suits by subjecting non­
resident directors to jurisdiction on constructive serv­
ice. In general, however, there has been little effort
in state legislation to keep corporate fiduciaries away
from temptation. State legislatures have not followed
the federal lead with devices like the recapture of
profits from "short trading-" or in extending fiduciary
duties to dealings with individual shareholders.l" Some
of the recent statutes may have actually reduced the
force of the common-law rules. For example, many
state courts have declared that transactions authorized
through the vote of a director adversely interested are
voidable regardless of fairness. The North Carolina
statute, however, provides that a transaction shall not
be set aside if proved to have been "just and reason­
able to the corporation" at the time it was approved.':'
Several recent statutes, furthermore, authorize the fix­
ing of executive compensation without a disinterested
majority in the board and without shareholder ratifica­
tion. There have been several provisions authorizing
stock option plans for executives. Some of these have
followed the Model Act optional provision which re­
quires approval by shareholders.!"
With respect to enforcement of fiduciary duties
through shareholders' derivative suits, recent statutes
are primarily concerned with the "strike suit" prob­
lem. They continue the trend toward the rule dis­
qualifying plaintiffs who were not shareholders at the
time of the alleged wrong. The recent statutes typi­
cally authorize indemnification of defendant directors
for litigation expenses in cases where the litigation is
settled as well as where defendants are judicially ex­
onerated. Most of these provisions follow the Model
Act in rejecting both the California requirement of
court approval and the New York requirement of re­
porting to shareholders.F The North Carolina statute,
however, does require court approval.t"
A few of the recent statutes include provisions for
posting by shareholder-plaintiffs of security for litiga­
tion expenses of defendants. Wisconsin gives defend­
ants a right to such security from plaintiffs holding
less than three per cent of the shares of any class.
I!)
North Dakota enacts the Model Act optional provision
under which no security may be required of plaintiffs
whose holdings exceed $25,000 in market value.s?
A companion provision authorizes the court, at the
end of any derivative suit, to require plaintiffs to pay
defendants' expenses if the court finds that the action
was brought without reasonable cause."
On balance, the recent legislation concerning fidu­
ciary duties illustrates the "enabling act" theory, since
its major concern has been lest application of common­
law doctrines should be unduly restrictive of corporate
management.
4. Election of directors
Most American statutes have not regulated the
allocation of voting rights as a means of promoting
management responsibility to those bearing the ulti­
mate risk. To be sure, provisions for removal of direc­
tors, with or without cause, are increasingly common.
Removal action, however, can be taken only by share­
holders with voting rights, and all of the recent statutes
permit denial of voting rights to any class or classes of
shares. The statutes have no general requirement of
"equitable" distribution of voting power like those
of the Holding Company Act and chapter ten of the
Bankruptcy Act. 22 Nonvoting common shares are per­
missible, and exclusive voting control may thus ap­
parently be vested in a small, closely-held class of
"management shares" representing only nominal in­
vestment. Furthermore, express authorization of vot­
ing trusts is now customary, usually limited to ten
ROIWll E. Degnan, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Utah, Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago Law
School during the Summer Quarter, 1958.
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years' duration, but without time limit under the Wis­
consin statute; 23 The importance of the statutory free­
dom to separate risk and voting control is somewhat
reduced, however, by the fact that the New York Stock
Exchange refuses to list nonvoting common shares.
Mandatory cumulative voting to permit minority repre­
sentation is provided in the Ohio= and North Caro­
lina25 statutes and in the original Model Act.26 These
statutes reflect a belief that, on balance, responsible
management, is promoted by providing this channel
of criticism, '. notwithstanding the dangers of dissen­
sion within the board. Most of the states following the
Model Act have chosen the alternative provision for
permissive cumulative voting.F' Massachusetts, how­
ever, has recently repealed its permissive provision
and now has no authorization.28
5. Preferred ,shares
"
... preferred stockholders are not-like sailors or
idiots or infants-wards of the judiciary."29 This dictum
of Judge Frank was pronounced in a case involving
"noncumulative" preferred stock. Paraphrasing Ger­
trude Stein, he insisted:
"
... a contract is a contract
is a contract.T" To what extent, we may ask, do pre­
ferred stock provisions of midcentury corporation
statutes reRect a similar philosophy? To what extent,
on the other hand, have preferred stockholders be­
come wards of the legislature? The North Carolina
John P. Stevens, of Rothschild, Hart, Stevens and Barry, Chi­
cago, Lecturer in Law for the Summer Quarter, 1958.
statute has gone farthest in the latter direction. I
shall summarize the principal provisions which sup­
port this statement and indicate some of the contrasts
afforded by other statutes.
Before this is done, however, it should be noted that
the North Carolina statute has also some unique pro­
visions designed to obviate troublesome problems of
interpretation without limiting contractual freedom.
It is provided that preferred shareholders are ex­
cluded from participating beyond their stated prefer­
ences (dividend and liquidation), unless the language
clearly indicates the contrary. Similarly, the amount
of any dividend arrearage is to be added to the stated
liquidation preference, unless this result is clearly in­
consistent with the charter wording.31
None of the state statutes approaches the kind of
standardization of preferred-stock provisions and reg­
ulation of capital structures which the Securities &
Exchange Commission has developed under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act. No state requires, as
do these SEC regulations, that holders of preferred
stock be empowered to elect a majority of the directors
when dividends are in arrears; nor do the state statutes
regulate the ratio of preferred to common stock in­
vestment.i" The North Carolina statute however, does
provide that, regardless of charter language, noncumu­
lative preferred shareholders shall be entitled to a
"dividend credit" to the extent that their dividends are
earned but not declared in any year.P"
Another unique provision of this statute enables
preferred shareholders to protect themselves against
distributions of capital surplus to common share­
holders in partial liquidation. Such a distribution re­
quires a majority vote of each class.r! (There is no
corresponding restriction, however, on the use of the
same funds to purchase common shares.) The statute
also contains a general prohibition of dividends and
purchases of shares if the action would reduce net
assets to an amount below the aggregate liquidation
preferences of preferred shareholders.35
Contemporary statutes deal in increasing detail with
changes in the position of preferred shareholders
through charter amendment, merger, etc. They typi­
cally contain express authority for cancellation of ar­
rearages but require approval by preferred share­
holders voting as a class, even if the class has no voting
rights in elections of directors. Following Delaware,
North Carolina requires only a simple majority of the
class.s" while the Model Act requires two-thirds."? The
North Carolina statute adds a caveat: "No inference
shall be drawn from the broad power of amendment
conferred by this chapter that an exercise of that
power in a particular case is fair and equitable.'?"
Contrary to the Model Act, appraisal rights are given
to dissenting preferred shareholders in certain cases
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of charter amendment as well as merger;39 and an ap­
praisal floor is set at two-thirds of the liquidation
preference if junior shares participate in the plan with­
out contribution. '10
The North Carolina draftsmen removed one of the
sources of the pressure sometimes exerted upon pre­
ferred shareholders to agree to a reduction of their
rights. In states where dividends out of current earn­
ings are forbidden when capital is impaired payment
of preferred dividends may require a reduction of
capital, which common shareholders are in a position
to block. The North Carolina statute not only permits
payment of preferred dividends out of current profits
when capital is impaired, but also makes this provision
override any charter limitation to the contrary.t!
Purchases of preferred shares at prices depressed by
suspension of dividends are somewhat restricted by the
requirement of prior notice of intention to make such
purchases.V Under the Texas statute, no shares may
he purchased when dividends are in arrears."
Most of the recent statutes have no similar provi­
sions restricting the allocation of risk, control, and
profit among holders of various classes of shares. They
leave it to investors in preferred shares (as they do
to creditors) to bargain out acceptable protective pro­
visions.
III
The foregoing summary makes clear that the recent
statutes reflect, in general, an "enabling act" theory,
more or less modified by the theory that corporation
statutes while assuring freedom of contract, should
reinforce in various ways the responsibility of individ­
ual decisions; and the theory that freedom of the
parties should be limited in order that the results of
responsible freedom may more nearly be approxi­
mated. Only the North Carolina statute has gone very
far in applying the latter theories; it thus has a kind
of "new look" which is conspicuous in the parade of
new statutes.
Apart from this almost unique design, what is there
in the other recent statutes, particularly those pat­
terned after the Model Act, which justifies the term
"new look"? It is sometimes suggested that the novelty
of design is to be appreciated by contrasting the Dela­
ware General Corporation Law. A principal drafts­
man of the Model Act reported the opinion of the
American Bar Association Committee that the Dela­
ware Act is44
poor in sequence and loose in its provisions.... [It] bids for
the corporate business of promoters. It makes little or no effort
to protect the rights of investors. Hence, in the opinion of the
committee, it was not the type of statute which the committee
should present as a model. . . . The model act makes use of
only one provision of the Delaware statute and that is the
provision empowering corporations to indemnify their di­
rectors....
Wex S. Malone, Projessor of Law, Louisiana State University,
Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law
School during the Stimmel' Quarter, 1958.
This quotation seems to me to exaggerate the dif­
ferences in substance between the Delaware and
Model acts. The examples of "loose" Delaware provi­
sions cited in this article are those permitting charter
amendment by simple majority and permitting divi­
dends from current earnings notwithstanding a capital
deficit.t" Neither of these features seems conspicu­
ously "loose"; both are incorporated in the new North
Carolina statute.t" the draftsmen of which were cer­
tainly solicitous of the interests of investors. There
are, of course, other provisions of the Delaware statute
which are open to criticism, such as the authorization
of dividends out of capital surplus with no requirement
that the source be identifled.t"
The most important contrast between the Delaware
and Model acts is that indicated by the statement that
the Delaware statute is "poor in sequence." At the
time the Model Act was prepared, the Delaware Act
was exceedingly difficult to use because of its lack
of convenient arrangement and its long, involved
sentences. In the revised Delaware Code of 1953, the
General Corporation Law was improved by breaking
Continued on page 22
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up and rearrangement of sections, but unwieldy sen­
tence structure still predominates. The Model Act has,
indeed, a new look: it is vastly easier on the eyes.
(Some of my friends out here in the provinces say
that it's the difference between Chicago and New York
styles of corporate draftsmanship.)
IV
We have seen that a more or less unmodified "en­
abling act" philosophy is dominant in most of the
recent corporation statutes, as it is in the Delaware
statute. It is a curious fact, hcwever, that this philoso­
phy is seldom articulated and almost never defended
with confident vigor. Its objective-responsible man­
agement in the interests of sharehclders-has been un­
der attack for over a generation. The attack has come
from many sources-from social philosophers and
theologians, from economists and law teachers and
business executives.
This movement began with Thorstein Veblen, who
caustically depicted the modern corporation, with its
inactive stockholders, as a prime example of "absentee
ownership."48 Of greater importance, perhaps, were
the pronouncements of corporation executives in the
twenties, heralding a new orientation of mmagement
loyalty. Henry Ford, in trying to defend his limited
dividends against minority stockholder attack, dis­
claimed any intention to maximize profits and pro­
posed, instead, to reduce prices for the henefit of car
buyers and to create more jobs. While the Supreme
Court of Michigan flatly rejected this view of corpo­
rate purposes;" other leading executives espoused the
same philosophy. Owen D. Young wrote that he con­
sidered himself a trustee not merely for stockholders,
but for the corporate "institution"-i.e., for stock­
holders, employees, customers, and the general pub­
lic.50
In 1932, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, in
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, gave
strong support to this idea, and their work was widely
hailed as a contribution of outstanding importance.
Tracing the extent of the separation of ownership from
control in the modern corporation, they challenged the
ethical claim of the inactive investor to the residual
profits of industry. They declared that'"
it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive,­
that the "control" of the great corporations should develop
into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims
by various groups in the community and assigning to each a
portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy
rather than private cupidity.
True, when Professor E. Merrick Dodd called for
legal recognition of the new principle of wider respon-
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sibility, Professor Berle suggested caution. 52 In re­
joinder, Dodd insisted that a principle of "vicarious
acquisitiveness" has little ethical or emotional appeal
either to managers or to the general public. For Dodd,
the principle of trusteeship for absentee investors pre­
sented a melancholy dilemma: "Abandon it as yet, we
dare not-enforce it with more than moderate success,
it is to be feared we cannot."53
I have said that the "social responsibility" philoso­
phy has had almost no influence upon recent statutes.
The one exception is the now popular authorization
of corporate gifts to charity. Even before these stat­
utes, of course, many types of donations were de­
fensible as means of creating consumer or employee
goodwill. The recent statutes, however, cover much
broader ground. The pressure for corporate giving was
a result of tax laws which made it increasingly dif­
ficult to finance charities through individual gifts.
Congress was induced to provide a limited tax deduc­
tion for corporate donations.P" One cannot dismiss the
state statutes, however, as merely dealing with a tax
problem. They do represent a limited acceptance of
the social responsibility theory, as the New Jersey
court recognized in the leading case.!" Many of the
recent statutes, furthermore, have set no limits upon
corporate gifts, either in terms of amount or of share­
holder approval. Ohio has recently repealed its previ­
ous limitations.56
As already noted, Professor Berle considers that
these statutes are signs of a corporate revolution. Mag­
nanimously, he now concedes victory to Professor
Dodd in their 1932 controversy over "To Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?"57 I find it hard to be­
lieve that the charitable-gift statutes and practices will
prove to be forerunners of a major change. Under the
traditional view, risk-taking investment is typically
made in the hope not only of cash dividends, but also
of appreciation reflected in stock prices and often
"realized" through stock dividends and splits with
gradually increasing total cash distributions. I see no
reason to think that this concept of common stock is
soon to be replaced by a concept under which the
expectation of stockholders will be limited, like that
of holders of perpetual debentures, with no claim upon
residual profits. Corporate giving may increase, but it
is unlikely that whatever profits are left after "reason­
able dividends" will come to be regarded as at the
disposal of the directors in accordance with their views
of public welfare.
Apart from these provisions for charitable contribu­
tions, the new concept of social responsibility has had
almost no elaboration. It is not merely that the theory
has' had no further influence on the actual statutes,
but in a quarter of a century, neither the originators
of this philosophy nor their disciples have sketched
with any detail or persuasiveness the lines of possible
practical application. And the few suggestions which
have been made justify skepticism as to the seminal
quality of the new theory.
In 1954, George Goyder, an English businessman,
published The Future of Private Enterprise-A Study
in Responsibility. In his view.r"
The weakness of Company Law at present is that the directors
are without legal guidance as to their responsibilities to the
workers, the consumers or the community.... What is wanted
is a General Objects Clause, declaring management responsi­
bility for "fair and reasonable prices," "regular dividends,"
"stable employment under good conditions so far as possible,"
etc. Once defined, the legal responsibilities . . . of the directors,
can be made actionable in a court of law, ...
Nothing could be simpler; but the history of utility
regulation and of emergency price and wage controls
is soberingly relevant. To say the least, standards of
"fair" prices and wages are hard to come by, and few
lawyers can be optimistic about the litigation process
as a mode of developing such standards.
More cautious is the approach of Howard R. Bowen
in Social Responsibility of the Businessman, part of a
study commissioned by the Federal Council of
Churches and published in 1953. Dr. Bowen endorses
the "social responsibility" concept, but, as an econo­
mist, he recognizes that businessmen'"
are often not in a good position to know how they can best
serve society, and their decisions based on the service motive
may often hit wide of the target.... They need short-cut
methods of reaching decisions that do not involve all the com­
plexities of relating every individual action to the social in­
terest. The price system provides that short-cut method. With
all its imperfections, it is a marvelous device for registering
A small portion of the gathering for the Alumni Luncheon
held in Los Angeles last summer in connection with the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association. Professor Katzen­
bach spoke on the place of international law in the Law School
curriculum,
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social valuations and thus providing a system of easily recog­
nizable signals by which individuals can reconcile their own
self-interest and the social interest. . . . [Thus, the business­
man should] rely primarily on profit as his guide. . . . [He
should depart from this guide only when it leads him toward]
restrictive monopoly, exploitation, fraud, misrepresentation,
political bribery, waste of natural resources, economic inse­
curity, etc.
Here, again, these terms offer little guidance to the
conscientious director (except as to misrepresentation
and other conduct forbidden by law).
In general, one may question the extent to which
socially responsible deliberation would actually lead
management to decisions different from those indi­
cated by long-range profit considerations. For ex­
ample, concern for employee goodwill might well
cause management to seek ways to cushion the effects
of production cut-backs, automation, plant relocation,
etc. If advocates of "social responsibility" would have
management go much farther in maintaining unprofit­
able operations, it is by no means clear that such ac­
tion would be socially responsible. And with respect
to price policy, however seriously management might
regard its social responsibility, perhaps the influences
operating to further the social interest would still be
principally those resulting from competition among
products and producers for consumers' spending.s? In
any event, management must be concerned with the
extent to which the new concept of corporate responsi­
bility may influence behavior of consumers or employ­
ees. If public opinion comes to expect corporations to
assume some new responsibility, this is a fact which
profit-conscious management can not ignore.
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Another "reform" proposed in the name of social
responsibility is the abolition of shareholder voting
rights. This is a measure advocated by Peter F.
Drucker after a period as official philosopher-in-resi­
dence at General Motors. According to Drucker, "there
is absolutely nothing in the nature of investment that
either requires or justifies ownership rights, that is
rights of control"; voting power should be "vested in
perpetuity in the Board of Directors," who would
elect to their number "representatives" of investors,
management, and the "plant community."61 Drucker
regards this as merely legalizing the disfranchisement
already existing in fact. Criticizing this position, Lloyd
K. Garrison expressed belief that'"
upon close examination it will be found that even in the case
of the great corporations whose securities are widely distributed
and largely voted by management proxies, effective control
over many basic policy decisions is lodged in some stockholder
group-perhaps in a very small minority, hut in an effective
one; ...
Drucker brushes aside or disapproves not only the in­
fluence of particular stockholders, but also the gen­
eral influence arising from the possibility of organized
opposition. But after recent examples of proxy war­
fare, it would be rash to assert that these possibilities
exert no wholesome stimulus or restraint upon manage­
ment. When poor management is reflected in reduced
earnings, the resulting decline in stock prices may
create attractive opportunities to accumulate shares
in a bid for control. To be sure, the stock market is
not an ideal mechanism for the discipline of manage­
ment. But, whatever may be the dangers from corpo­
ration "raiders," it is at least doubtful that management
responsibility would be improved by making it im­
possible to acquire working control through purchases
of stock.?"
The vitality of the "social responsibility" theory is
not to be measured by the limited enthusiasm which
these typical proposals have engendered. The theory
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is important as a perennial insistence that there just
must be some new way of disciplining corporate profit­
seeking. Expressing his disappointment with Bowen's
report, the Rev. F. Ernest Johnson asked almost
wearily "Is it not possible to devise instruments of a
more authentic corporate responsibility?"64 But the
prospect of a break-through on this front is not en­
couraging, for what is demanded is a contrivance
which would operate neither through individual re­
sponsibility and competitive markets nor through
political controls.
The new philosophy has thus far succeeded in pro­
ducing only an unresolved discontent with existing
corporation law. It has obscured the values served by
the older philosophies and the fact that these philoso­
phies also can lay claim to the "social responsibility"
label. Perhaps corporation law critics should keep
straining to catch Professor Berle's VISIOn of "The
Modern Corporation and the City of God."65 But in
the meantime, we need not be defensive about the
statutes of North Carolina and Texas-or even those
of Illinois and Delaware. None of them, to be sure, is
a model ordinance for the City of God. But the cor­
porate organizations they make possible are institutions
not inappropriate for economic activity in the Earthly
City.
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the court is supplying the rule to govern the situation
in issue.
This brings us to the crux of the judicial dilemma:
if a legislative pronouncement on the point is lacking
(and I pass over what qualifies as such), how should
a court decide whether formal compliance with a
given rule is enough? I suggest that, in seeking guide­
posts for implementing legislation, at best the court
can only fall back on an examination of the dominant
legislative purpose or theme behind the particular
rule or the complex of inter-related rules of which
it is a part. Unfortunately courts sometimes seem
to believe that they should look further afield in this
quest for the statutory drift. They then are in danger
of discovering only that the policy of the tax law is
to raise revenues for the government. (In one opin­
ion the Supreme Court held against the taxpayer be­
cause, among other reasons, it found that the section
of the statute in question was an aspect "of the com­
prehensive tax program enacted by the Revenue Act
of 1942 to increase the national revenue to further
the prosecution of the great war in which we were
then engaged"). When a court properly restricts itself
to considering the function and purpose of the rule
within the framework of the technical law, as revealed
by history and legislative surroundings, it is in a posi­
tion at least to make an informed judgment whether
the thrust of the statutory rule is better promoted by
rigid adherence to form or otherwise. Nothing more
can be asked of the judiciary.
There has been much argument through the years
about the judicial legislation which occurs when a
court refuses to apply a rule literally. I should like
to remark only that giving a rule literal application
is likewise a variety of judicial legislation, except that
it generally favors the taxpayers and hence is less
likely to draw condemnation from their advisors.
The most celebrated instances of judicial limita­
tions being placed upon literal application of the
statutory rules involved corporate reshuffiings, where,
under our statute, different forms for corporate dis­
tributions and adjustments carry different tax conse­
quences. It is in this area that the courts frequently
restricted availability of the more advantageous form
to transactions which were found to have a business
purpose and not merely a tax savings motif. Our ex­
perience with these judicial versions of the business
purpose doctrine nicely illustrate some of the more
pronounced consequences of relying on the courts to
defeat the tax dodger. Taxpayers are never sure
which of the many corporate reshuffiing rules will
attract the business purpose qualiBcation, and they
never know how much (or whose) business purpose
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will suffice. If only a modicum of such purpose is
enough, the skilled tax practitioner perhaps can be
counted on to arrange for its presence. But if a very
substantial dose is demanded, the requirement might
defeat many transactions which the business commu­
nity regards as normal. From the Treasury's view­
point, however, the uncertainty might be other than
an evil. Taxpayers are forced to operate without a
roadmap for successful tax dodging, and the resulting
doubts about the terrain clearly have the effect of
reducing the magnitude of the problem by discour­
aging experimentation with novel transactions.
These characteristics of the judicial approach to
coping with tax dodging bring us to the legislative
efforts. In the main they have followed three patterns.
One has been to specifically qualify certain rules
with a hroad directive regarding the consequences
of a tax savings motive or an absence of business
purpose. Legislative directions of this nature have
been given a variety of expressions. The taxpayer is
to lose if tax avoidance is found to be a principal
purpose, or he is to lose only if it is found to be the
principal purpose, or only if it is found to be a major
purpose; and furthermore, the words with which the
burden of proof is placed on the taxpayer have dif­
fered in their forcefulness. All such directives, how­
ever, have one thing in common. Regardless of their
particular phrasing, they embody a kind of circularity.
Improper tax minimization is enjoined by requiring
a showing that tax avoidance was not high on the
list of motivations. But since the transaction, if it
passes muster, does result in a tax advantage, and
since we can't expect the rational taxpayer to be
Shown above is a Class of 1924 Luncheon held for Hon.
Willis H. Ritter, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court for the
District of Utah, and a member of the Alumni Board. Re­
sponsible for the arrangements teas Charles A. Bellows, who
is standing, second from left.
blind to this fact, the courts ultimately are required
to distinguish between acceptahle tax minimization
and unacceptable tax avoidance. It is only a slight
overstatement to say that these legislative directives
inveigh against tax dodging by instructing the courts
to strike down instances in which tax avoidance
loomed large, without defining what tax avoidance is.
The courts thus must determine when minimization
constitutes avoidance, and when such avoidance is so
large a component of the motivation as to run afoul
of the statutory directive. It can be seen that a legis­
lative business purpose rule operates essentially not
unlike its judicial counterpart.
An important exception deserves mention. A stat­
utory directive-and particularly one that explicitly
puts discretionary power in the hands of the Treasury
-is apt to cause taxpayers to seek prior administrative
clearance of transactions which conceivably could run
afoul of the anti-avoidance doctrine. POSSibly the
most significant consequence of the statutory direc­
tives is to place enormous leverage in the Treasury
through its power to rule or refuse to rule on pro­
posed transactions. The wisdom of this result has not
gone unchallenged.
A second legislative pattern has been the enact­
ment of specific rules to meet new tax avoidance sit­
uations as they are discovered. This approach, for
example, has typified our handling of the capital gain
versus the ordinary income question presented by
bonds issued at a discount and bonds purchased with
coupons detached. Its efficacy depends in large part
on the willingness of the legislature to backstop the
Continued on page 36
During his recent visit to Chicago, Hon. Willis W. Ritter,
/D'24, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court, Salt Lake City,
lunched with residents of the Law School Dormitory. In the
picture above, features of the new Law Buildings are being
pointed out to the Judge.
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Melvin H. Specter, JD'28, has practiced law in East Chicago
for thirty years. He has served as president, or a member of,
the Library Board, Red Cross, Salvation Army Board, Com­
munity Chest, Brotherhood Week, the Boys Club, and numer­
ous professional organizations. Mr. Specter was cited by the
University of Chicago Alumni Association for public service
and good citizenship.
L. Albert Wehling, JD'35, head of the department of govern­
ment of Valparaiso University. He has written widely in the
field of public law and government and is a member of two
bar associations and [our learned societies.
Von E. Livingston, JD'28, is a partner in Campbell, Livingston,
Dildine and Haynie, in Fort Wayne, to which city he moved
in 1941, after practicing for thirteen years in Chicago. He is
a director of four corporations, and has taken a prominent
part in the work of the Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary
Club, the Executives Club, and a variety of professional and
fraternal groups. He is presently Chairman of the Committee
on Administrative Law of the Indiana State Bar Association.
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John Schindler, lr., of Mishawaka, is a partner in Schindler
and Schindler. He has served as President of the Chamber
of Commerce, as a Governor of the County Bar Association,
City Attorney, Chairman of the Mayors Advisory Committee
on Urban Renewal, member of the Committee of 100 of South
Bend-Mishawaka, and has been active in numerous other civic
enterprises.
The Honorable Norman F. Arterburn, JD'26, has been a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Indiana since 1955. Before
becoming a member of the Court, he taught law at Washburn
College, served as prosecuting attorney, and engaged in the
private practice of law for twenty-eight years. Judge Arter­
burn has engaged in numerous civic activities and written
widely for legal publications.
Robert H. Mohlman, JD'41, is Assistant Vice President of the
Inland Container Corporation, in Indianapolis. He is a direc­
tor of the Anderson Box Company, and has served as president
of his church, member of the Allocations AdVisory Committee
of the United Fund of Greater Indianapolis, and Regional
Chairman of the Law School Alumni Fund.
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Jerome Hall, JD'23, is Distinguished Service Professor of Law
at Indiana University, in Bloomington. He was a Special Fel­
low at Columbia University, Beniamiti Research Fellow at
Harvard Law School, and has received an honorary Doctor
of Laws degree from the University of North Dakota. He
was Fulbright Lecturer in the United Kingdom and served
the U. S. Department of State as a Specialist on their Edu­
cational Exchange Program. Mr. Hall has written widely,
principally in the fields of criminal law and iurisprudence.
Richard J. Smith, JD'39, is the owner of Smith Chevrolet, in
Hammond. He is Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Com­
mittee and member of the Executive Committee of the Cham­
ber of Commerce, and a Great Books leader.
Benjamin Blumberg, JD'13, of Terre Haute, describes him­
self as retired, although it appears that he is Honorary Presi­
dent of the County Boy Scout Council, Vice President of
Indiana Blue Cross, Honorary Life Director of the YMCA,
a director of Highland Iron and Steel and of the local tax­
payer's association, Past President of the Chamber of Com­
merce, the United Hebrew Congregation, and a member of
more than a dozen other civic, projessional and fraternal
groups.
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Henry R. Sackett, '29, of Gary. Mr. Sackett is a partner in
the firm of Sackett, Pyatt and Waitkus. He has served as
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Lake County, and Assistant
United States Attorney. Immediately following the war, Mr.
Sackett was Assistant Prosecutor, under justice jackson, at
the Nuremberg Trials, and later served as an Assistant Prose­
cutor at the japanese War Crimes Trial in Tokyo. He is (/
past president of the Gary Chamber of Commerce.
john E. Newby, lr., of Newby and Lewis, La Porte. Engaged
in the general practice of law, Mr. Newby is president of the
Park Board of his city, and active in a variety of other civic
enterprises, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Kiwanis
Club.
Charles D. Kelso, jD'SO, a former law clerk to Mr. justice
Sherman Minton, is Assistant Professor of Law -at Indiana
University School of Law, Indianapolis.
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Joseph J. Wasko, '35, practices law in East Chicago, where
he has served as special counsel for the city, and is currently
Probate Commissioner of the Superior Court. He has been active
in the Red Cross, the Elks, his church, and a variety of bar
groups. Mr. Wasko is currently President of the East Chicago
Urban Renewal and Redevelopment Commission.
William B. Merrill, JD'28, of Merrill and Reiber, Fort Wayne.
In addition to his private practice, Mr. Merrill is presently
Associate City Attorney. He has participated in a variety of
civic activities, and is currently Deputy Grand Master of the
Odd Fellows for the State of Indiana.
Benjamin Piser, JD'27, of South Bend, is in individual prac­
tice, with two associates in his office. He is an Associate
Editor of the NACCA Law Journal and was Vice President
of NACCA in 1957. Mr. Piser is a member of the state Board
of the ACLU, and is active in United World Federalists, the
Jewish Welfare Fund and the United Fund.
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Wayne Guthrie, '22, of the Indianapolis News, is author of
the daily column, "Ringside in Hoosierland." Mr. Guthrie has
been on the staff of the News since 1921, successively as re­
porter, assistant city editor, city editor and assistant managing
editor. He has spoken extensively, on a national basis, on
the atomic bomb tests which he covered at Bikini. In addi­
tion to many other civic activities, Mr. Guthrie has three times
served as International Chairman of Kiwanis.
Paul B. Huebner, JD'52, is in practice in Hammond.
Jerome F. Kutak, LLB'28, is President of the Guarantee Re­
serve Life Insurance Company of Hammond, and of the Na­
tional Protective Life Insurance Company. He is a director
of the Southeast National Bank and of the Life Insurance
Company of America. Mr. Kutak has been active in Kiwanis,
the Chamber of Commerce, in "Masonry, and in a variety of
bar associations. His son, Robert, was graduated from the
Law School in 1957.
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Bernard A. Petrie, LLB'30, of Friedrich, Petrie and Tweedle,
in Hammond.
Wilbur J. Glendening, JD'34, in practice in Hammond.
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statute year after year with a considerable mass of
more or less trivia. Even with a completely cooper­
ative legislature, however, the approach cannot avoid
the vexatious problem of the innovator. Should the
early bird be allowed the advantage which is being
denied to others, so that speed and daring in tax
avoidance is rewarded; or should the legislation be
made retroactive to cover everybody; or should some
compromise position be taken? Generally we have
shied away from giving our so-called loophole clos­
ing measures an effect prior to their date of enact­
ment or introduction into the legislature, probably
in the thought that retroactivity is unsportsmanlike
and may even be unconstitutional. But we frequently
have accompanied them with an expression of com­
mittee intention that no inference about the prior law
is to be drawn from the statutory charge, thus offer­
ing the courts a free hand to make the law for the
earlier period. Occasionally we have tried to move
in the opposite direction by statements to the effect
that the new statutory language is intended only to
be declaratory of what is thought to be the existing
law. While this procedure may be persuasive with
the courts, it cannot serve to bind them. _
A third legislative pattern has consisted of dealing
more or less comprehensively with a given area of
tax law by trying to anticipate the situations which
might arise and prescribing specifically on which side
of the tax line they fall. The collapsible corporation
provisions of our statute are illustrative of this tech­
nique. Such highly detailed provisions answer many
particular questions which actually arise or might
otherwise come up-but at a very real price. Obvi­
ously they add considerably to the bulk of the law.
It is also evident that the legislature can neither an­
ticipate all the line-testing questions which might
arise nor safeguard completely against ambiguity in
the many words employed in disposing of the ques­
tions covered. Inherent in this technique, moreover,
is what some regard as the unfortuante quality of
providing tax minimizers with an excellent blueprint
of avoidance plans which apparently have received
legislative blessing. Specificity and clarity, in brief,
make the use of tax savings techniques a lot easier
and the code a lot longer.
To this juncture I have considered tax dodging
from the standpoint of combating it; I shift now to
the perspective of the tax practitioner. While as an
informed citizen he might well feel that the artful
tax dodge should be checkmated-although I hope
he will take care that the cure is not worse than the
irritation-as a practitioner he should avoid con­
fusing ethics and common sense. Since it is the
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indeterminacy of the legal rules that is at the heart
of the tax avoidance problem, I see no moral or
ethical inhibitions against trying out new and doubt­
ful schemes. Practitioners need feel no guilt in send­
ing up trial balloons. But I am convinced that
frequently such experimentation represents poor
judgment and sometimes verges on being foolish. I
mean only that all things considered, including an
assessment of the chances of success and the costs
of losing, the taxpayer's interests would be better
served by taking an alternative path. All too often,
from the taxpayer's vantage-point, the real vice of
being a tax-minimization pioneer is not that the plan
ultimately fails to gain the tax advantage scught, but
that in choosing the dodge, the taxpayer foregoes
other tax opportunities or business or estate planning
openings which are unquestionably available to him.
Permit me to add, parenthetically, that I couple
the freedom of practitioners to experiment with a
broad license in the administrators to shoot at the
trial balloons. Furthermore, it may be that our sys­
tem is deficient in not penalizing unsuccessful experi­
ments more heavily than now in view of the costs
which they impose on the whole legal apparatus.
There is one respect in which the pursuit of tax
minimization does or should raise an ethical question
for practitioners. All too often the willingness to take
the gamble rests not alone on the cleverness of the
plan but in part on the thought that the facts as
stated in the tax return and accompanying documents
will not Hag the arrangement for the administrators.
Thus it is hoped that the plan may succeed because
it is passed over without a test on the merits. Even
if such incomplete disclosure does not violate legal
standards, I submit that it comes precariously close
to being unsporting conduct and to trenching on the
high ethical standards to which professional men
assert they aspire.
It would produce a misleading emphasis to end on
this moralistic note. Instead I prefer to remind you
of what ultimately lies at the base of the tax avoidance
problem. Tax dodging arises in acute form only be­
cause our tax statute, in defining taxable income,
makes distinctions which depart from a comprehensive
measurement of a taxpayer's actual economic en­
hancement. Thus our tax law distinguishes between
a dollar of ordinary income and a dollar of capital
gain, a dollar of realized income and a dollar of un­
realized income, and so forth. All of us feel and
usually act on the feeling that, in maximizing our
income or our economic enhancement, a dollar is a
dollar. When the tax law distinguishes between dol­
lars, it must do so in terms which are unrelated to
the real economic position of the taxpayer and which,
in this sense, are arbitrary. The essence of the tax
avoidance problem is found here: where the basic
distinction drawn by the law is itself arbitrary, no
satisfactory general principle is available for deciding
when taxpayers should be defeated in their attempts
to move themselves across to the favorable side of
that arbitrary line.
At a Class of 1912 luncheon honoring Judge Walter L. Pope,
JD'12, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Judge
Pope, left, is shown with classmates Judge Ebner ]. Schnack­
enberg, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, center,
and David Levinson of Chicago, who arranged the meeting.
Hon. Walter L. Pope, JD'12, Judge of the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and a member of the Alumni
Board, at lunch with the Editors of the University of Chicago
Law Review. At left, Michael B. Douty, of Chicago, A.B.
Swarthmore College; and Robert Doan, of Dayton, S.B. Indiana
Univ., S.M. Univ. of Illinois; at right, Alan V. Washburn,
Editor-in-Chief, of Rapid City, S. D., A.B. Shimer College.
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Some Members of the Board of
the University of Chicago Law School Alumni Association
Left to right, standing, William C. Burns, JD'31, Paul R. Kitch, JD'35, Hubert L. Will, JD'37; seated, Richard F. Babcock,
TD:46, Han. Abner J. Mikca, JD'Sl, Richard James Stecens, JD'38.
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Standing, left to right, Stuart B. Bradley, jD'30, Keith I. Par­
sons, jD'37, P. Newton Todhunter, jD'37; seated, Hon. Willis W.
Ritter, jD'24, Hon. Walter L. Pope, jD'12, Louis H. Silver, jD'28.
Morris E. Feiwell, jD'15, Senior Vice President, American
National Bank, Chicago, President of the Unioersitu of Chi­
cago Law School Alumni Association.
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Among Law School Alumni In Texas
E. Karl McGinnis, JD'23, Professor Emeritus, Business Law,
The University of Texas, Austin, Texas. Mr. McGinnis has
served as a member of the Austin City Plan Commission and
is currently Vice President and a director of the First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Austin.
Edward C. Fritz, '40, of Fritz and Vinson, Dallas. Mr. Fritz
has been practicing law in Dallas since 1940, with special in­
terest in problems of damage inflicted by harassment, and
in usury law. He is active in, and a director of, several Dallas
civic organizations.
J. Newton Bauzor, JD'21, of Houston, a senior member of the
firm of Royston, Rayzor and Cook. Mr. Rayzor, and his firm,
are specialists in admiralty and maritime work, with offices
in both Houston and Galveston. He is a Trustee of Baylor
University and a Life Trustee of Rice Institute.
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John H. Freeman, '12, of Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates
and Jaworski, Houston. Mr. Freeman is a director of, and
general counsel of, Anderson, Clayton and Company, a direc­
tor of the First City National Bank, of Houston, President of
the M. D. Anderson Foundation and active in numerous other
charitable and professional groups. He has received the hon­
orary degree of Doctor of Laws from Baylor University.
E. Ernest Goldstein, '43, Professor of Law at the University
of Texas. Mr. Goldstein has served as General Counsel to
the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House
Judiciary Committee. He is the author of a casebook on Patent,
Trade-Mark and Copyright Law. In addition to that field,
he also teaches international law and anti-trust. He has been
chairman of the International Law Committee of the Associ­
ation of American Law Schools.
Dudley K. Woodward, lr., JD'07, of Dallas. Mr. Woodward
was in private practice in Austin and later in Dallas, until
1944, at which time he began to devote all of his time to his
work as Chairman of the Board of Regents of the University
of Texas. Shortly after the conclusion of his service on that
Board in 1955, Mr. Woodward became Chairman of the Exec­
utive Committee of the Committee of Seventy-Five, a group
set up by the Regents to study the past development of the
University of Texas and to chart its future progress.
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Ramsey Clark, JD'51, of Dallas, a member of the firm of Clark,
Reed, and Clark.
R. GlIY Carter, JD'30, is senior partner of Carter, Gallagher,
Roberts, lanes and Magee, in Dallas.
Toomin-
Continued from page 6
States of trusteeship over the islands. Under Chapter
11 of the Charter of the United Nations, provision
is made for the assumption by members of the admin­
istration of territories, whose people have not yet
attained full self government. Under such provisions,
members agree to accept as a sacred trust, the obli­
gation of promoting the well being of the inhabitants
of such territories.
In pursuance of the national policy of maintaining
these islands within our sphere of influence, Congress,
on July 18, 1947, authorized assumption of the trustee­
ship. By the trusteeship agreement, termination of
Japanese control was recognized, and the United
States named as the administering authority. Under
it, the United States assumed the obligation of pro­
moting the economic advancement and self sufficiency
of the inhabitants; of protecting their civil rights and
fundamental freedoms, without discrimination; of
fostering and developing a general system of ele­
mentary education, and the pursuit of higher and pro­
fessional education as well. It also agreed to promote
the self government of the people in accordance with
their expressed wishes, and to give them an increas­
ing
.
share in the administrative services in the ter­
ritory. And lastly, it agreed to provide a system of
law which would give due recognition to the well
recognized native customs of the inhabitants.
Upon approval of the Trust Agreement by the
Security Council, the President directed the Navy
Department to provide, on an interim basis, appropri­
ate administration to implement this country's obli­
gations under the Trusteeship Agreement. It was no
longer possible to operate the machinery of govern­
ment through military directives backed by Navy guns.
It was now necessary to set up a government oper­
ating under civil rules of administration, with the
branches of government and their powers adequately
delineated, a system of laws established, and a judi­
cial branch established in order to interpret and en­
force those laws.
The administrative head of the new government
named by the President, was the Commander-in­
Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, who was
given the title of High Commissioner. To his sub­
ordinates was assigned the task of preparing the
necessary draft of a bill of rights and constitution,
as well as a new legal system, tailored to the needs
of this far-flung aggregation of communities.
The sea-going lawyers proved to be as adept at ini­
tiating a formal civilian government as they had been
in administering its military predecessor. In short
order they hammered out a series of directives which
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were adopted by the High Commissioner as the basic
framework of the new system of laws. They took the
shape of a bill of rights and a series of regulations
covering the division of powers and duties of govern­
ment and its sub-divisions, as well as a code of crimes
and criminal procedure, and provisions for judicial
procedures and law enforcement.
When their task was completed, they had prepared
a series of interim regulations of some eighteen chap­
ters, of which Chapter 1 was the Bill of Rights, setting
up the framework of a system of government (its con­
stitution ), together with the statutes designed to carry
into effect this constitutional system. A later chapter
was added with respect to communications, so that
the entire scheme of government, as well as the stat­
utes designed to implement the powers delegated,
was finally compressed into 19 chapters, divided into
some 1,204 sections, and running slightly over 139
pages of text.
Before one becomes lost in admiration at this ap­
parent example of concise draftsmanship, yet it be
noted that there are a number of ready answers. First,
we are dealing with a society which, though not prim­
itive, is far below the complexity of western civiliza­
tion, and up to this time has required only relatively
limited application of the principles and practices
incidental to modern business, finance, and govern­
ment.
Second, it is possible to adopt other legal systems
hy a few apt words, thus dispensing with the requisite
detail where each provision is to be set forth with
particularity. As will be seen, such is the case here.
And, third, where not restricted by constitutional
inhibitions, as here, broad powers may be delegated
to administrators, and considerable discretion allowed
in the exercise of these powers. Although this pattern
is not to be described as markedly democratic, it is
nevertheless completely workable.
These interim regulations adopted by the Navy,
and as amended from time to time, continued as the
sole body of law applicable in the Trust Territory
from July 18, 1947, until December 22, 1952, approx­
imately a year after administration of the Territory
had passed from Navy, and become vested in the
Department of the Interior. That Department ap­
pointed a civilian as High Commissioner, who, in
1952, by proclamation adopted these interim regula­
tions as the official Trust Territory Code of Laws.
In a foreword to the printed code which accom­
panied the proclamation, the then High Commis­
sioner, former Senator Elbert D. Thomas, had this
to say:
"On this wisdom of our two American judges to
appreciate law as a growing organism, and on the
ability of our more than 100 Micronesian judges
to overcome the forces of the past and rule in ac­
cordance with law, will depend the ultimate suc­
cess of attaining our objectives."
It may be of interest to take a quick look at this
code to see why its successful administration depends
so largely on the wisdom of the two American judges.
As above stated, Chapter 1 consists of a Bill of Rights.
There are 14 sections, 10 of which are adapted with­
out significant change from the first 10 amendments
to the Federal Constitution, Of the 4 additional, one
guarantees freedom of migration and movement within
the Trust Territory; a second assures free elementary
education throughout the Territory; a third permits
the High Commissioner to restrict ownership of real
property and business enterprises to citizens of the
Trust Territory; and the last requires due recognition
of local custom in providing a system of laws.
Chapter 2 undertakes to designate the laws and
legal systems applicable in the Trust Territory. It
repealed all the Spanish, German, and Japanese laws
theretcfcre adopted, and provided that the following
were to have the effect of law: (a) The Trusteeship
Agreement; ( b) such laws of the United States as
shall by their own force be in effect in the Trust Ter­
ritory; (c) The Trust Territory Code; (d) District
Orders promulgated by the District Administrators
of Trust Territory, with the approval of the High
Commissioner; and (e) duly enacted Municipal Or­
dinances.
Recognition of local custom was assured in a sec­
tion providing that customary laws not in conflict
with the laws of the Trust Territory, or those laws
of the United States in effect therein, were to have
the force of law in matters to which they were held
by the courts to be applicable.
The further proviso was made that the common law
of England, as it existed on July 3, 1776, and as inter­
preted by American decisions, was to be in effect in
the Territory, except where local land law was in
conflict therewith. An express provision also appears
that the laws governing ownership, use, inheritance,
and transfer of land, in effect in the Territory Decem­
ber 1, 1941, were to remain in full force and effect,
except where changed by written enactment under
the authority of the Trust Territory Government.
Due recognition was given to the desirability of
amending the Code from time to time, by a provision
that such could be done through Executive Order
promulgated by the High Commissioner. Thus, it can
be seen that the legislative power is lodged primarily
in the High Commissioner, secondarily in the District
Administrators, and finally in the municipalities cre­
ated under the authority of the Code. It can also be
seen that there has been created a hybrid legal sys­
tem in which there has been engrafted on the common
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law, a wealth of native customary law developed over
the centuries in a society where land is the truly basic
resource. As may be surmised, this imposes a sub­
stantial burden on those charged with the duty of
determining which rule of law is applicable to a given
set of facts.
For the purposes of this paper, no other chapter
of the Code needs discussion save the article relative
to the judiciary. Under it the judicial power is vested
in a High Court for the entire Territory, a District
Court for each administrative district, and a Commu­
nity Court for each municipality. The High Court
is a court of record, and has both a trial and an appel­
late division. The Trial Division consists of the two
judges named to the court, and the Appellate Divi­
sion consists of the judge whose judgment is not being
reviewed on appeal, and two judges from a panel
named by the Secretary of the Interior for the pur­
pose, from those sitting in the Island Court of Guam.
The High Court has original jurisdiction of all cases
originating in the Territory, civil and criminal, as
well as probate, admiralty, and maritime. It is not
required to, and usually does not, accept jurisdiction
over causes which are within the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts. Its Trial Division has appellate juris­
diction of all decisions of the District Courts, and the
duty to review on the record all final decisions of both
District and Community Courts where no appeal has
been taken.
This review provision of the Code was inserted in
order to expose the trial practice of the lower courts
to the scrutiny of the High Court for the purpose of
assuring that substantial justice was done. Though
the Code authorizes the reviewing Justice to reverse
and remand any judgment believed by him to have
been entered erroneously, even though no appeal has
been taken therefrom, in practice the review proce­
dure is utilized by the reviewing Justice to point out
palpable error and suggest appropriate change.
In addition to this review procedure which though
onerous, serves a highly useful purpose, further ap­
pellate jurisdiction inheres in the Appellate Division
of the High Court, to review on appeal, all decisions
in cases tried by the Trial Division and in certain
cases heard by that division on appeal or review of
decisions of the lower courts.
District Court judges are named by the High Com­
missioner, usually upon recommendation of the Chief
Justice of the High Court, but are removable by the
High Court for cause and after hearing. The number
of judges assigned is based on the amount of judicial
business in the particular district. District Courts
have original jurisdiction over civil causes involving
claims of property not exceeding $1,000.00 in value,
excepting admiralty and maritime matters, and adju­
dication of title to real estate; and jurisdiction over
criminal cases where the maximum punishment does
not exceed a fine of $1,000.00, or imprisonment for
one year, or both. Each District Court has appellate
jurisdiction over all decisions of the Community
Courts, civil and criminal.
Community Court judges are appointable by the
respective District Administrators, and removable by
the High Court for cause and after hearing. JurisdiC­
tion is limited to civil cases where the values involved
do not exceed $100.00, except admiralty and maritime
matters, and adjudication of title to land, and criminal
cases where the maximum punishment does not exceed
a fine of $100.00, or imprisonment for 6 months, or
both.
Further provisions appear whereby the High Court
may require any case pending in the inferior courts to
be transferred to it for further proceedings; also dele­
gating to the Chief Justice administrative supervision
over all the courts of the Trust Territory and their
officers, with the power to make rules regulating plead­
ing, practice, and procedure in the various courts, and
the conduct of business therein. The Chief Justice is
also empowered to appoint and remove the Clerks of
Courts for the various districts, as well as all other
court employees, provided that native inhabitants are
to be employed as judges, clerks, and employees to the
maximum extent consistent with good administration.
Provisions appear with respect to judicial procedures
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in the enforcement of extra ordinary remedies, such
as attachment, execution, and levy on property, habeas
corpus, and the commitment of insane persons; also
with respect to criminal procedures in the matter of
process, search and seizure, bail, and the protection
of fundamental rights of the accused. These are similar
to procedures set up by the statutes of the several
states. They are supplemented by a series of rules
of civil and criminal procedure promulgated by the
Chief Justice, adopting certain portions of the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.
Accordingly, it can be seen that insofar as is ap­
parent from the provisions of the Trust Territory Code,
and of the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, the
courts of the Territory have to same basic legal back­
ground, are called upon to enforce, in general, the
same civil rights, and use, on the whole, pretty much
the same techniques and procedures as are employed
in similar situations within the United States. There
are, however, several basic differences, which result
in imposition on the judges of the High Court, of
responsibilties, duties, and discretion more demanding
than those required of conventional Federal judges.
In the first place, territorial trials are not held before
juries. The standard of general education in Microne­
sia, though constantly improving, is still far below
the level needed to assure adequate deliberation by
the ordinary resident on issues of fact. Local in­
fluences are particularly strong where the clan and
lineage system operates, and the impact of foreign
cultures too recent to permit of even a moderate use
of this trial method. Accordingly, a judge has the
burden initially of acting as his own jury, and after
determining the facts, of applying to them the relevant
legal principles.
Second, in nearly all civil cases the parties are with­
out the aid of a professional bar in the drafting of
pleadings, motions, and other documents, and during
the trial. Customarily they appear with some trusted
advisor, who undertakes to present the testimony and
such argument as his understanding of the issues will
permit. This imposes on the High Court the necessity
of questioning each witness for both sides rather ex­
tensively in order to be sure that the record contains
all the essential facts. The court has great latitude­
and exercises it-in adjourning trials until some essen­
tial testimony may be forthcoming which the parties
have neglected, or for the purpose of examining the
site where land or other disputes are involved. But
the most important weapon in the judicial arsenal is
the pre-trial conference, and its usually resultant order.
This conference is set by the court early in its sitting,
and the parties and their advisors are invited to present
their respective theories of the case. The court then
strives to obtain the necessary background of the case
and agreement on matters not in controversy. In an
order there is then stated the contentions of the parties,
the agreements reached between them, and the issues
remaining to be resolved by evidence at the trial.
In this manner the court is able to eliminate all but
the essential evidence and to center the parties' atten­
tion on the real matter at issue. A vast amount of
court time and effort is thus saved, and the handling
of judicial business expedited. However, the burden
thus imposed on the court is substantial, as the draft­
ing of the pre-trial order is frequently onerous; and
convincing the parties that the order adequately pro­
tects their interest, involves a considerable amount of
salesmanship, particularly in the light of the language
barrier. It may then be stated that the lack of a trained
professional bar adds enormously to the duties
and responsibilities of judges of the High Court, and
in this respect their lot is far less happy than that of
their brethren with the heavier robes.
Frederic S. Lane, of Chicago, B.S., University of Pennsylvania,
Chairman, The Moot Court Committee.
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It is an axiom of human conduct that everyone es­
pouses a just solution to controversy, provided it is in
his favor. Since the court ex hypothesi desires in
each case to achieve substantial justice, and since the
parties are mainly interested in achieving their own
ends, the parties have developed the practice of using
what are known as Trial Assistants. These assistants
are usually present or former Assistant Public Defend­
ers, who have become somewhat familiar with the
court rules and procedure, and have acquired some
understanding of basic legal principles. By court rule,
these trial assistants have been given status before
the courts and have become amenable to court disci­
plinary action. It is hoped the use of trial assistants will
increase until the advent of a trained professional
bar, of which there is as yet but the faintest glimmer
on the horizon. How comforting it will be to High
Court judges of the post atomic age to doze gently in
their courtrooms while pretending to listen to the
learned argument of counsel. And how pleasant to be
able to examine with practiced eye the orders prepared
by counsel, noting merely whether they contain the
essential facts and judicial prerequisites.
This leads to the third point of difference between
practice in the Trust Territory and in stateside courts.
It follows from what has been said hereinabove that
in all civil cases, all orders, and much of the record
of the proceedings, are prepared by or under the
Gloria P. Martinez, of El Paso, Texas, A.B., Texas Western
College, Editor-in-Chief, The Student Lawyer.
supervision of the trial judge. In addition to the pre­
trial order, there is the final judgment order contain­
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law. If there
is an appeal, the record of proceedings is typed by
the court reporter and submitted for examination to
the trial judge, who makes any necessary revisions,
then certifies it, and sends it on to the appellate tribunal
with the exhibits and the common law record. All that
the party, or his trial assistant, customarily does is to
present a brief and argument, although this is not
essential to a consideration of the appeal by the ap­
pellate court.
What has been said above does not apply in its en­
tirety to criminal trials. Here we have a territory-wide
District Attorney, who presents all felony cases to the
High Court in the districts of their origin. These cases
are defended by a Public Defender, he and the District
Attorney being professional lawyers recruited from the
American bar. They have assistants in each district,
who are qualified to present and defend misdemeanors
before the District Court judges, and to prepare the
necessary complaints in all cases in the absence of
the District Attorney.
However, all orders in criminal cases, the report of
proceedings, and the record on appeal, are prepared
under the direction of the trial judge. He does not
take such a dominant part in the conduct of criminal
trials, as there is adequate representation of both
parties to assure presentation of essential evidence.
However, he frequently examines witnesses and takes
upon himself the responsibility of determining that the
fundamental constitutional rights of the accused have
not been violated, particularly where the introduction
of a confession is sought by the prosecution. Great
pains are taken by the trial judge in pronouncing sen­
tence to make sure the defendant understands the
purpose of the punishment, as well as the factors con­
sidered by the court in determining sentence. It is a
cardinal principle of the High Court that it is not only
essential to do substantial justice in each case, but
that the people generally, if not both litigants, rec­
ognize as such.
The final distinctive difference in practice between
Stateside courts and those of the Trust Territory, is in
the impact of customary law in the Territory. First
in the Trusteeship Agreement, then in the Bill of
Rights, and finally in the Code, it was recognized that
the customary law in existence in various parts of
the Trust Territory, in matters to which it was ap­
plicable as determined by the courts was to have
the full force and effect of law, to the extent not in
conflict with the written basic law formalized in the
Code. Though the common law was made generally
effective in the Trust Territory, it was provided by ex­
ception thereto, that it would yield to recognized local
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custom. In addition, an express provision was inserted
in the Code concerning land law as hereinabove
described.
The impact of customary law upon the otherwise
common law of Trust Territory can be measured when
it is realized that in practically all of the districts, in
addition to the customs in force governing ownership,
use, inheritance, and transfer of land, there are well
recognized customs having the sanction cf law, in
marriage, divorce, adoption, and wills.
When to the foregoing is added the further qualifi­
cation that the customs differ not only from district to
district, but occasionally from municipality to munici­
pality of the same district, it becomes obvious what
a headache this matter of customary law may present
to the casual jurist. So important is the impact of
custom on litigation generally, that by Code provision
and rule of court, the courts are permitted to avail
themselves of a local expert called an "assessor," who
is usually a District Court judge, and who sits along­
side the trial judge and is permitted to ask questions
of the witnesses to the same extent as counsel and
the trial judge. While the parties are invited to present
their own evidence as to custom, it may be assumed
that the advice of the court's expert shares importantly
in the court's decision.
These are the principal differences in practice be­
tween Stateside courts and those of the Trust Territory.
However, let it not be assumed for a moment that they
tell the whole story. There is more to the transaction
of judicial business in the Trust Territory than con­
ducting a pre-trial conference, cr presiding at trials.
It is quite different here from the occasional peril of
travelling by taxi from a federal judge's comfortable
apartment on the near-north side, to his well-equipped
chambers and imposing courtroom in the United States
courthouse.
Our High Court justices travel frem district to
district as often as judicial business requires, in am­
phibious planes carrying not over 15 passengers, and
up to several thousand pounds of freight. Water land­
ings are made in three of the districts, and on land in
the other three. In two of the districts where the plane
comes to rest on the surface of the lagoon, it taxies to
a sea ramp up which it waddles and then comes to
rest for discharge of passengers and freight and re­
fueling. The passengers then leave for their hotel,
either by launch through the tricky three mile channel
at Ponape, or by jeep several miles across the cause­
way to Koror Island in the Palau group. In the third
district which requires water landings, Yap, there
is no sea ramp, so that the plane must tie up to a buoy
in the harbor and discharge passengers and freight
onto a waiting barge, which transports them a half­
mile or so to the pier. In all of the districts where
Matthew E. Brislaum, of Pullman, Washington, A.B., Wash­
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water landings are employed, it is necessary for a
launch to sweep the 'runway' to be utilized by the
oncoming plane, of any debris which might become
a peril to its fast approach or departure. It is a thrill,
which is never dulled by constant repetition, to take
off in these comparatively small planes, fly from 500
to 800 miles of ocean, and unerringly find one's way
into the relatively calm waters of the target lagoon.
Where these planes land on an airstrip, their ex­
bomber pilots usually waste no time in preliminaries,
such as circling the air field or banking to reduce
speed. One of them comes in exactly as he used to
do on the deck of a carrier, with a sudden descent and
no apparent slackening of speed. Nor is the take-off
at daybreak on a rough coral runway entirely con­
ducive to pleasant digestion and peaceful slumber.
Added to these perils is another from which stateside
judges are relatively free, namely the malevolent use of
magic. In criminal cases, High Court judges are un­
fortunately subject to an occasional "hex" which is
used to ward off an adverse decision. In a recent trial
at Yap, the accused employed a "sure" method of in­
serting such confusion and uncertainty into the judicial
mind as to preclude an unfavorable decision. This
he did by tearing leaves into small bits and scattering
them along the road from the judge's quarters to the
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courthouse. Unfortunately for the accused, this jurist
had been in such a chronic state of confusion induced
by a study of some involved native customs, that the
"hex" had relatively little effect. Accordingly this
magician now sits in a cool cell wondering what could
have gone wrong, as he serves the sentence imposed
on him by the confused jurist.
When he travels to the various districts, the High
Court Justice is usually met by a delegation consisting
of District Judges, the Clerk of Courts, and local
prosecutors and public defenders, from whom he will
get the latest news concerning readiness of cases on
the trial call. Later in the day he will visit the court­
house and groan over the inadequate facilities, for
it is a deplorable fact that construction or renovation
of courthouses is on the public works agenda far be­
hind the necessary expansion of hospital facilities
and construction of schools. This is why it is such a
pleasure to sit in the new courthouse at Korol', where
the almost completed building is so attractive as to
have earned the Sobriquet, "Taj Mahal."
However, conditions are constantly improving, and
as funds are made available by Congress, serious de­
ficiencies are being alleviated. In its operation of the
Trust Territory the United States has amply demon­
strated that it has taken to heart the objectives of the
Trusteeship Agreement. Signs abound that the native
populations are showing a marked advance in health,
education and civilization, and a steady improvement
in economic well-being. In all this the United States
can take a justified pride, as can the many dedicated
staff members who man the necessary facilities.
Americans coming to Micronesia and rendering
significant service in the fields of medicine, law, edu­
cation, and public health, are deservedly held in high
esteem by the native ·populations. Those having the
appropriate professional background and the stimulus
towards the experience of living among and working
with the eager natives, will find their lives in Trust
Territory rich in reward. They will be disappointed,
however, if they expect this reward to come in the
shape of a beautiful hand maiden sent by her tribe
to grace the home of the altruistic worker. The writer
is constrained to sadly admit, that though he has toiled
for some time on the outlying islands in a position of
responsibility and power, no such experience has as
yet befallen him.
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